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Over the last five years, the United States influenza vaccine supply chain saw both shortages of 
vaccine at peak demand time and excess inventories after the influenza season had ended.  There were 
marked shortages of flu vaccine in 2000, 2003 and 2004 and between 4 and 15 million doses of flu vaccine 
were wasted each year between 2000 and 2004.  Because of a shortage mentality, health care providers may 
have issued not only duplicate, but inflated orders to multiple distributors and manufacturers.  
Accompanying this stress on the supply chain, there are problems in opportunistic vending; Chiron 
corporation lost their entire 45 million units production in 2004, and within one week’s time, 80% of 
hospitals were offered flu vaccine between $40 and $80 per shot, more than four times the original price of 
$8 per shot, and 20% were offered vaccine at $80 per shot or more.  This has led to a loss of between $200 
and $500 million for manufacturers and health care providers.  We posit if there are better ways to 
coordinate this supply chain?   
We interviewed industry professionals and government officials, surveyed physicians and queried 
electronic databases.  We reviewed the literature on the influenza vaccine supply chain, on supply chain 
coordination, and on the economic value of flu vaccination.  We identify the three main sources of 
uncertainty in the supply chain as production yield uncertainty, demand uncertainty and uncertainty in the 
severity and onset timing of the flu season which compounds demand uncertainty.  We determine who 
currently bears these risks.  We conclude that in the influenza vaccine supply chain there are unextracted 
profits for all parties involved.  Rates of mortality are highest amongst the groups that are of high priority 
for vaccination.  Insurers and the public are at the greatest financial loss on the order of billions.   
We use a simplistic model to illustrate why it may be profitable for insurers to buyback excess units 
of flu from health care providers, combined with the industry wide use an Information-Hub.  We formalize 
this model into a contract we call a “buyback with prerequisites.”  Through a numerical example, we 
illustrate how this could increase every supply chain member’s profits.  We comment on other initiatives 
such as investing in new production technologies, the merits of using an information-hub alone, improving 
incentives to prebook, a secondary market for reallocation efficiency, and universal vaccination.  
1 The Position of this Work in the Literature 
 
This paper aims to do several things which can be described as falling into three major categories, 
identifying the structure of the US flu vaccine supply chain, consolidating relevant sources of data, 
aggregating the various siloed viewpoints and opinions from many tiers of the supply chain, and offering 
analysis with the aim of supply chain coordination.    
First, we identify and map the current structure of the flu vaccine supply.  This includes identifying 
risks and uncertainties in the supply chain, how these risks are allocated, and the timelines that govern 
forecasting, production, procurement, and risk transfer.  Second, we aggregate the available data regarding 
vaccination efficacy, patterns in production and waste, and the views of the government, the flu vaccine 
industry, health care providers and to some extent, the public.  Third, we postulate how risk in the supply 
chain can be more logically allocated to reduce the effects of moral hazard and to bring about better 
coordination, which in this case, means higher profitability for all parties and higher vaccination rates.  
 
2 The Problems 
 
We highlight some of the key problem areas in the flu vaccine supply chain. 
2.1 Problems in Supply and Distribution 
 
For the 2004-5 flu season, production capacity of 100 million doses was established, split equally between 
the two suppliers of US flu vaccine, Chiron Corporation and Aventis Pasteur (now Sanofi Pasteur).  On 
November 7, 2004, Chiron Corporation, one of the two manufacturers of injectible flu vaccine for the US, 
announced that because of contamination in its Speke, Liverpool facility, it was prevented from releasing 
any of its flu vaccine for the 2004-5 flu season.  This reduced the U.S. vaccine supply by nearly half, from 
100 million to 55 million.  
The CDC planned an emergency redistribution of flu vaccine with the only remaining supplier, 
Aventis.  Meanwhile all over the U.S, panicked elderly began demanding flu vaccine.  Opportunistic 
vendors began actively soliciting hospitals, offering doses of vaccine at steep margins.  Price gouging 
lawsuits began in several states.  The candidates in the 2004 presidential election became involved, each 
creatively placing the blame for the vaccine shortage on the other’s political camp. Finally, now five 
months after the CDC’s emergency rationing and redistribution scheme, there is ironically a significant 
unused surplus of about 4 million units and Aventis potentially faces tens of millions in lost revenue.  
The worst example of opportunistic vending in times of shortage was exposed in a 2003 
Washington Post article; during the flu vaccine shortage of the 2000-01 flu season, a New Jersey 
wholesaler bought discounted vaccine intended for nursing home patients, promising not to resell the drug. 
They violated that contract and within 11 days, the units of vaccine had changed hands 3 times, going from 
$23.65 in New Jersey to $147 in Pittsburgh.    
2.2 Problems in Demand 
 
Demand for flu vaccine is largely a function of perceived necessity and the current public perception 
is that flu vaccine is “unsafe and ineffective” (Dorland Healthcare 2004).  Because of these biases and a 
misconception of until when vaccination has efficacy, overall demand is low even though the medical 
literature consistently shows that flu vaccination is cost effective and substantially reduces illness.  It may 
be the case that people who should rationally get a flu shot do not; some people would pay less for a shot 
than they expect to pay in missed work or for medication.  This is either a case of irrationality or bounded 
rationality. 
There is also a problem with the public perception of when vaccination is efficacious.  Through 
discussion with the CDC, we learned that vaccination has utility through at least January.  However, many 
Americans believe that the only useful time to be vaccinated is at or before Thanksgiving (late November).     
 
2.3 The Decision Problems 
 
We discuss the decision problems faced by manufacturers and health care providers in some detail. Each 
year, manufacturers ask “how much vaccine should be made?” [The lot sizing problem] while contending 
with demand uncertainty and yield uncertainty.  Because of the uncertainties, manufacturers have to 
allocate extra capacity, some to buffer against production uncertainties, and some to make vaccine to stock 
for late ordering and changes in already placed orders.  Furthermore health care providers will face two 
complicated problems regarding influenza vaccination, namely: how many units should be procured at 
what time and from which supplier [the procurement problem] and given the current state of supply and 
demand, who should be given priority for vaccination?  [The priority problem] 
 
2.4 Unique Challenges in the Flu Vaccine Supply Chain 
 
 The flu vaccine supply chain poses unique challenges for several reasons: 
 
Six to nine month lead time culminates in a one to two month selling season: 
Manufacturing has to begin after the Center for Disease Control and the World Health Organization 
identify the dominant three strains for the coming flu season, 7 to 11 months in advance.  This 
identification has been successful in nine out of the last ten years.  Following strain identification, egg 
based production takes up to nine months from start to finish.  The vaccine must be shipped and store in a 
“cold chain,” or a refrigerated supply chain which adds to the holding cost.  All of this implies that health 
care providers have to forecast demand up to 9 months in advance.  The flu season is short enough that 
manufacturing cannot be staggered and emergency production is not currently possible. 
 
Unused vaccine discarded at the end of the season: 
The three virus strain mix must be reengineered every year.  The previous year’s vaccine cannot be used.   
 
Flu vaccine is medicine sold to healthy people: 
Demand must be generated through public awareness.  Demand is sensitive to perceptions. 
 
Vaccination business is not largely profitable for health care providers; misalignment of incentives and 
responsibilities. 
Flu vaccination is more a public service than a private enterprise; profit margins may be low as evidenced 
from our survey of health care professionals.  There is no salvage value for overstock and goodwill loss 
from understock is unclear.  Health care providers do not bear the risk for poor forecasting; they do not 
have a financial incentive for making sure the high risk patients are vaccinated, other than the lost profit 
margin.  Their main incentive is the Hippocratic Oath, appealing to doctor’s good nature.  (Compare with 
insurance companies who may have to pay one or two orders of magnitude the cost if an elderly person gets 
sick because of the did not get vaccinated) 
 
Tension between pre-booking and regular booking: yield uncertainty versus demand uncertainty: 
The health care provider must choose between the benefit of a certain service level guarantee through pre-
booking even though it exposes them to the risk of demand uncertainty, and the benefit of waiting longer 
into the season to order even though it exposes them to the risk of not getting units or getting them at a 
higher price.  The manufacturer must choose between the benefit of better planning through pre-booking 
even though it exposes them to the risk of yield uncertainty, and the benefit of waiting longer into the 
season to take orders (so that prices might reflect supply and demand more accurately) even though it 
exposes them to the risk poor planning. 
2.5 The Root of the Problem 
 
The main source of all the troubles regarding the flu vaccine supply chain is a time consuming and 
economically inefficient egg based production technology combined with public demand that is variable 
and does not reflect a rational understanding of vaccine efficacy.  The time to produce does not allow for 
any slack in the system for distribution lead time buffering, nor does it allow for staggered production.  The 
erratic demand for influenza vaccine in the United States, which is irrationally low from a cost benefit 
analysis, combined with the minimal efficient scale (MES) for egg based production, just barely make the 
business profitable and do not allow for more than just a few manufacturers.   
 We comment on some initiatives to aid in these root problems.  For example, the U.S. 
government and the Crucell Corporation are investing in cell based technology which promises to reduce 
lead times and yield uncertainty.  The U.S. National Institutes of Health (NIH) granted $9.5 million to ID 
Biomedical to develop their cell based technology.  They are in early stage human trials for that new 
influenza vaccine.  Also, in January 2004, Aventis and Crucell created a partnership to produce influenza 
vaccine using Crucell’s Per.C6 cell based technology.  Their agreement covers production of vaccine for 
both the epidemic and pandemic flu vaccines.   
In short, cell based production technology is said to offer the following improvements over egg 
based production: 
1. A production process with lower variation. 
2. A lower cost per unit (excluding R&D costs) 
3. A shorter lead time on the order of weeks. 
4. An improvement in quality compared to existing vaccines 
a. No need for mercury to prevent against salmonella infection of eggs.  The use of 
Thimerosal aggravates the public’s mistrust of the vaccine.  
b. No potentially allergenic animal protein additives. 
5. Finally, Crucell would be able to produce vaccines against some of the most virulent strains of 
influenza which in some cases are difficult using egg based technologies.  
a. Many strains of influenza come from water fowl.  An extremely virulent strain will have 
an increased ability to kill fowl and destroy bird eggs, making the standard chicken egg 
production difficult.  The potential pandemic strain H5N1 fits into this category. 
The main focus of our work, however, is toward supply chain coordination given the current difficulties.  
3 Toward Coordination: The “Buyback with Prerequisites” 
and an Information hub  
 
It may be profitable for insurance companies to offer a buyback of excess vaccine inventory from health 
care providers.  Increasing the stocking quantity at the health care provider may lead to savings by reducing 
the number of more serious return visits.  We are intrigued by the idea of combining such a buyback with 
the use of an information-hub “that instantly processes and forwards relevant information to all appropriate 
parties. The information hub is a node in [a] data network where multiple organizations interact in [the] 
pursuit of supply chain integration. It has the capabilities of data storage [and] information processing. The 
overall network forms a hub-and-spoke system with the participants' internal information systems…”  (Lee 
and Whang 2001)  We also comment on the value of adopting an information- hub in the flu vaccine supply 
chain even without a buyback.  
Because of the Federal Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), people 
who become so ill, for example with the flu, so as to warrant visiting the emergency room, must be treated 
regardless of insurance status.  Health care providers will most likely pass these costs onto the insurers in 
the form of higher treatment costs. Such treatment can cost between $142 for those directly discharged 
from the emergency department, and $3,250 for those who must be hospitalized.   
Thus it is in the best interest of the insurers to stabilize demand for the vaccine for those who are 
statistically most at risk.  Because a buyback would bring about a higher stocking quantity at the health care 
provider we conclude that as long as we can encourage good forecasting and honest forecast sharing 
throughout the supply chain, insurance companies will likely see increased profits as fewer people trickle in 
to the health care provider with flu.    (We stress that we only recommend Pareto dominant initiatives and 
that we are not recommending altruism on the part of any party involved in this supply chain.) 
 In our future vision of a flu vaccine supply chain information-hub, health care providers, 
distributors and manufactures would all have accounts to keep track of who ordered what amount of flu 
vaccine from whom and when that order was placed.  In an ideal world, with completely digitized medical 
records, health care providers would submit an order with a marker for which patient that order was 
intended for; this would eliminate the order gaming problem.  Even though this is many years from reality, 
it may be reasonable to assume that large, capital intensive facilities have the capabilities to participate in 
such a system.   Our buyback with prerequisites consists of five steps: 
1. The CDC and the NIH collaborate closely with insurers to standardize what groups should be 
considered as high priority for vaccination.  The CDC and NIH have a scientific understanding of the 
spreading of influenza communication, and the insurers have a unique perspective on reimbursement 
costs and trends; the combination of both perspectives may lead to new insights. 
2. Insurers offer a buyback of excess flu vaccine inventory from health care providers under the 
following conditions: 
a. Health care providers generate a report of their (as defined above) high priority patients and 
share that report with insurers. 
b. Insurers offer to buyback excess flu vaccine that was intended for those high priority patients 
in the report. 
c. Insurance Companies, Manufacturers and the CDC create an information-hub through which 
health care providers would be obligated to order. 
We can compare the initiatives with their benefits: 
 
Initiative Benefits 
The CDC and the NIH collaborate closely with 
insurers to standardize what groups should be 
considered as high priority for vaccination.   
 
The CDC and NIH have a scientific understanding 
of the spreading of influenza communication, and 
the insurers have a unique perspective on 
reimbursement costs and trends; the combination of 
both perspectives may lead to new insights. 
Insurers offer a buyback of excess flu vaccine 
inventory from health care providers. 
This would increase the order quantity at the health 
care provider, increasing the vaccination service 
level. 
Health care providers generate a report of their (as 
defined above) high priority patients and share that 
report with insurers. 
This will improve forecasts at the health care 
provider.  The buyback acts as an incentive.     
Insurers offer to buyback excess flu vaccine that 
was intended for those high priority patients in the 
report. 
This restricts the buyback and leads to forecast 
revelation in the supply chain.   
Insurance Companies, Manufacturers and the CDC 
create an information-hub through which health care 
providers would be obligated to order. 
This will create more reallocation efficiency and 
make health care provider’s forecasts transparent, 
thereby removing the order gaming problem.  
 
We are calling this type of buyback, a “buyback with prerequisites.”  In essence it is a type of buyback 
determined by a prerequisite exchange of information.   
 
Figure 1:  The “Buyback with Prerequisites” and an E-Hub 
The adoption of the information-hub has several merits.  With regard to pandemic preparedness, 
the United States Human Health Services (HHS) states as the fifth element of the Phase 0, level 0 – Inter-
pandemic phase: “Determine size of priority groups and develop a plan for vaccinating them (For example, 
will hospitals be responsible for vaccinating their staff, and who will vaccinate those responsible for 
community safety?).” The adoption of the information-hub for use in the standard acquisition of flu vaccine 
could include a design that aggregates this data for the government while paying for itself.   
The manufacturer benefits from more accurate advance planning since under this scheme, all units 
would be prebooked, and the prebooked units would be made through the information-hub.   The insurer 
benefits further from the formation of a reliable dataset of the trends in high risk group vaccination.  The 
information-hub eliminates the multiple and inflated ordering problem because of order transparency.    
Also, the information-hub generates reallocative efficiency as there would be a log kept of where unit of flu 
vaccine have been shipped and received.    
In terms of market reallocative efficiency and redistribution efforts, the information-hub would 
serve as a secondary market, where health care providers and distributors would order directly from other 
health care providers and distributors who wish to sell excess.  Then well established reverse logistics 
providers, for example Fed-Ex or UPS, could directly handle redistribution and reallocation with 
comparative ease, cost advantage, and internal to the market economic efficiency, over the U.S. 
Government.  
Ordering through an information-hub would also aid in the health care provider’s decision 
problems.  Most worthwhile to note is that it alleviates the confusion caused by opportunistic profiteering 
in times of shortage; secondary distributors often invest in strategic inventories of crucial or highly 
demanded medications to sell in times of shortage and burden health care providers with repeated emails 
and faxes promising vaccine availability, albeit at a steep margin.  With such repeated solicitations, health 
care providers will have a difficult time knowing the extent of the shortage, and if the pressures of shortage 
have subsided.  This leads to suboptimal decision making because of information distortion.  The 
information-hub helps this issue by making wholesaler’s inventories, manufacturer’s inventories, and 
health care provider orders transparent to all relevant parties.  Not only would this be more ethical, but 
potentially profitable, as health care providers can make closer to optimal decisions and manufacturers and 
credible wholesalers can receive faithful demand data, and clearly display their inventories for purchase.      
3.1.1 A Simple Experiment 
 
Under some reasonable assumptions, we give a numerical illustration of our buyback with 
prerequisites: 
 





ORDER QUANTITY 88 96 8 +9% 
HIGH RISK 
VACCINATED 
42 45 3 +7% 
COST TO THE 
INSURER 
$903 $617 -$286 -32% 
MANUFACTURER’S 
PROFIT 




$126 $145 $19 +15% 
Figure 2:  A Numerical Experiment 
4 Conclusion 
 
In the flu vaccine industry, demand leads supply.  Supply is threatened by uncertainty in demand, 
demand rates that do not reflect the true utility of flu vaccination, uncertainty in the onset and severity of 
each flu season, and a rational under ordering phenomenon by health care providers.   Long lead times 
aggravate the problem; health care providers have to forecast patient demand long in advance.   This all 
stems from the antiquated egg based production technology that is so time consumptive and inefficient that 
the time to produce does not allow for any “slack” in the system for distribution lead time buffering, nor 
does it allow for staggered production.  The minimal efficient scale (MES) of production in the eggs is such 
that demand for influenza vaccine in the United States, which is irrationally low from a cost benefit 
analysis, just barely makes the business profitable, while not allowing for more than a couple 
manufacturers. 
The structure of the health care reimbursement system in the U.S. is such that the two biggest 
losers in the system are patients who cannot get vaccinated as they would like to be (or should be from a 
rational standpoint) and insurance companies who have to reimburse health care providers for more serious 
and expensive problems that develop as a result of low vaccination rates.  Those who are not covered by 
health insurance and who find themselves sick are covered by the EMTALA act of 1986 and health care 
providers are likely to pass this cost on to insurers as well.   
 We studied several initiatives:  First we proposed the notion of ordering through an information-
hub mechanism to eliminate order gaming and aid in pandemic preparedness. Second we suggest a buyback 
of excess flu vaccine at the health care provider by insurance companies with certain prerequisites that are 
intended to encourage a Pareto Dominant solution to some of the current problems.  We pointed to some 
intuition as to why the buyback might help via a numerical illustration.  The insurance company buyback as 
we have modeled it is intended to do several things:  First we hope such a model will serve as a source for 
further investigation into richer and more applicable models.  Second we hope that the measures used in the 
model will help characterize policy performance and serve as a benchmark for which to base further 
conversation.  Such measures include high risk group vaccination rates, stocking quantities at the health 
care providers, market allocative efficiency market reallocative efficiency, and supply chain profitability. 
 
5 Future Research 
 
Our work suggests several areas for research: 
 
1. To characterize the value of establishing a quick reverse collection and redistribution mechanism 
and its impact on initial ordering and demand fulfillment along with practical suggestions for 
implementing such a scheme. 
 
2. To develop a decision model for health care providers that supports optimal procurement policies. 
 
3. To further model the demand process for flu vaccine at each health care provider and to determine 
the appropriate causal and correlated variables.  This extends to identifying the time varying 
correlation between the demand processes at different health care providers.   
 
4. To find data that supports item 3.  It has been rumored that point of sales data for cold and flu 
medicine at Wal-Mart has been well maintained and thus may be useful to this end.  
 
5. To clarify disparities in the economic valuation of vaccinating against flu. 
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